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Abstract
After the collapse of communist regimes and fall of USSR and Yugoslavia the newly created 
states became extremely vulnerable in what concerns their energy security. Even more unsecure 
are the de facto states – territories that behave as independent states but are not recognized 
internationally. Their obligations to ensure well-being and eventually welfare for its citizens make 
them use every possibility to ensure basic supplies, energy being the primary one. However, in 
one case this obligation seems oddly reverse – the de facto state of Transdniestria is able to use 
its energy source to manipulate politics in the Republic of Moldova, under which Transdniestria 
de iure belongs. The aim of this article is to explore the situation in the de facto states with 
special focus on Transdniestria – separated from the Republic of Moldova – which paradoxically 
uses the decision to build an enormous power station on its territory in Soviet times to blackmail 
the Republic of Moldova and to make murky alliances and deals with Russia and others in the 
region in order to promote interests of its elite and keep Moldovan ambitions at bay.
Introduction-how internationally non-recognized de facto states ensure well-
being of their inhabitants?
How internationally non-recognized de facto states ensure well-being of their inhabitants? 
How do they deal about the energy security? How sustainable are their energy policies? This 
article provides some insights into this topic with specific example of Transdniestria, the de facto 
state that seceded from the Republic of Moldova.
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1. Subject of research – de facto states
1.1. The biggest changes of international order in the second half of the 
twentieth century
Out of the entire second half of twentieth century the biggest changes in international 
order were brought up at the end of eighties and beginning of nineties. These changes were 
most radically pronounced in the Eastern bloc – the area of collapsing communist regimes 
where specifically those countries, which were not mono-ethnic and/or mono-religious were 
prone to disintegration regardless of some dire consequences resulting from newly found radical 
nationalism and religious affiliations. Particularly prone to disintegration proved to be the Soviet 
Union and Yugoslavia, fall of which led to many local wars, ethnic and religious cleansing and 
formation of new states.
The formation of new states was relatively easy only in one case – Czechoslovakia, where 
the border between Czechia and Slovakia was very clearly defined and has basically copied the 
ethnic border too. In the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, however, borders were rather fluid, not 
really copying the ethnic and religious borders, and especially in the Soviet Union they were also 
opportunistically drawn by geographers who had to respect erratic and often xenophobic orders 
by Soviet leaders, before all Joseph Stalin and to certain extent Nikita Khrushchev too.
The disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union – in spite of all bloodshed – respected 
the borders between the federal republics that had on paper the right to secede according to 
Yugoslav and Soviet constitutions (even though those constitutions had never been respected and 
served as a fig leave for the communist regimes where the leadership of the communist party 
stood before constitutional law and order.) Reality, however, proved to be much more difficult. 
There have been a number of entities that evolved from the warfare both in Yugoslavia and Soviet 
Union.
1.2. Fall of Yugoslavia
In Yugoslavia it was at first the Republic of Serbian Krajina located within Croatian borders 
between 1991 and 1995, and annihilated by Croatian Army in the “Storm” operation in 1995. Then 
it was Kosovo whose Albanian majority leadership declared independence back in 1992, and 
where the tensions led to the outbreak of violence since 1995 and full-fledged war in 1999. After 
2008 renewed Declaration of Independence of Kosovo, the situation is further complicated by 
aspiration of Serb-populated Northern Kosovo (“Ibarski Kolašin” in Serbian language) to re-join 
Serbia. Bosnia and Herzegovina, torn apart between Muslim (Bosniak), Serbian and Croatian 
communities by the war that started in 1992, ended up after 1995 Dayton Agreement divided 
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between (Bosniak-Croat) Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska. The 
leadership of Republika Srpska, the Serbian entity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, has declared on 
number of occasions that they will hold a referendum on cessation from Bosnia and Herzegovina 
in 2018. Furthermore, the regions of Vojvodina (in Serbia) and Sandžak (Serbia, Montenegro) 
have occasionally demonstrated their desire to enjoy more autonomy from Belgrade and/or 
Podgorica, and ethnic Albanians living in Serbia (in Preševo valley) and Macedonia (the western 
and north-western part of it) even led armed resistance against authorities in Belgrade and 
Skopje.
1.3. Collapse of USSR
During the period of the fall of the Soviet Union, and couple of years before (that eventually 
led to the dissolution of USSR), situation got even more complicated. The region of Caucasus 
proved to be by far the most volatile and has remained such until today but Central Asia, Moldova 
and most recently Ukraine have unfortunately experienced their portions of violence and 
conflict too. The hostilities on the territory of former Soviet Union ignited the sparks of exalted 
nationalism in all the former communist countries. The conflict between Armenians and Azeris, 
that started in 1988 and demonstrated its most violent phase in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict but 
affected Armenian communities in Azerbaijan (the biggest cities of Baku, Ganja and Sumgait) 
and Azeri communities on the margins of Nagorno-Karabakh and beyond, remains as tense as 
ever. Later the Georgian-Abkhaz dispute led to first occurrence of violence in 1989 and eventually 
secession of Abkhazia from Georgia, and also in Georgia the two South Ossetian conflicts (1991-
1992 and 2008) led to yet another secession within Georgian borders. Within Russia itself the 
republics on northern flanks of Caucasus proved to be cradles of both ethnic and religious 
conflicts. The conflicts between Ingush and Northern Ossetian forces that started in 1989 and 
escalated in 1992, was soon totally overshadowed by developing conflict in Chechnya, which 
led to two Chechen wars (1994-1996 and 1999-2000), between which Chechnya became a de 
facto state. Separatist insurgencies later occurred in Dagestan, Ingushetia and to limited extent 
in Kabardino-Balkaria too. Meanwhile another post-Soviet state – young Republic of Moldova 
– had to go through violent conflict that started in 1989, went through first skirmishes in 1990 
and led to full-fledged war of Transdniestria in 1992. Another conflict with ethnic background in 
Moldova – fortunately non-violent – was the dispute on status of Gagauzia. Also Central Asia was 
no strange to conflicts, especially in Tajikistan (1992-1997) and in Kyrgyzstan (2010). Fergana 
Valley – located mostly in Uzbekistan with great portions of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan – is the 
region with the most eccentrically drawn borders in the former Soviet Union that in post-Soviet 
era disabled natural communication links, severed old trade ties, restricted religious freedom 
and helped to increase hostilities in-between nations and also internally. It has led to number 
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of clashes – in Osh and Uzgen (KG) in 1990, in Andijan (UZ) in 2005 and again in Osh (KG) in 
2010. The latest post-Soviet conflict started with protests in Ukraine that resulted in so called 
Euromaidan in 2013-2014,  removal of president Yanukovich from his office, intrusion of Russian 
forces that annexed Crimea, and outbreak of hostilities in Donbass region of eastern Ukraine, 
which resulted in de facto secession of two separatist entities under the titles of Donetsk and 
Luhansk Peoples’ Republics.
1.4. Dif ficulties of ensuring the welfare in de facto states
Creation of so many internationally unrecognized entities, some of which transformed into 
de facto states, presented many challenges for their hastily installed leaderships. In the times of 
uncertainty and warfare most of the inhabitants of those territories sooner or later demanded 
nothing else than stability and dignified life. The elites in those de facto states soon found out 
that ensuring very basic welfare is far from easy. The imminent tasks consisted of ensuring food 
supply chain, potable water supply, energy supply (fuel and electricity) and heating in case of 
winter conditions. That proved to be rather difficult task and many of these territories previously 
ravaged by war initially suffered from food and energy shortages, sometimes for years.
1.5. Focus on post-Soviet de facto states – situation of Transdniestria and others
Conditions, in which these entities found themselves, differed enormously. This article 
deals mainly with Transdniestria but for comparison it is good to have a look at other post-Soviet 
territories. Those de facto states that survived outside pressures or - conversely were created 
because of outside pressure usually depend on their sponsor state since independently they 
would not be able to economically survive. In cases of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Crimea, Donetsk 
and Luhansk “republics” and Transdniestria this outside sponsor is Russia; in case of Nagorno-
Karabakh it is Armenia. Other entities ceased to exist or accepted existence within borders of a 
recognized state (Chechnya, Gagauzia etc.). Out of these entities Transdniestria and Crimea are 
special cases because they don’t have a land border with their sponsor state. Crimea as de facto 
annexed territory is in better position since the annexation constitutes much bigger commitment 
by Russia than only sponsorship. Moreover Crimea has a maritime border with mainland Russia 
and the bridge from mainland Russia is being built. Transdniestria finds itself in more difficult 
position since it is surrounded by landmass controlled by Moldova and Ukraine, and doesn’t have 
direct access to the sea. That was not an important issue until the change of regime in Ukraine 
after “Euromaidan” and worsened relations between Ukraine and Russia because of Russia’s 
annexation of Crimea and meddling in eastern Ukraine. However, Transdniestria has one unique 
lucky advantage – the existence of massive power station on the territory under its control.
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2. The energy consumption in USSR and a power station in 
Transdniestria
2.1. The reason for Kuchurgan Power Station existence
Soviet Union was a country with a huge disregard to environment and – with its vast 
resources – careless attitudes to enormous energy consumption by its heavy industry. The 
solution to energy consumption was to build ever more enormous power plants. At the beginning 
of sixties it was decided that one of those enormous power plants will be built in south-eastern 
part of USSR and will provide energy supply for most of – then – Moldavian Soviet Socialist 
Republic (Moldavian SSR) and Odesskaya oblast’ (prefecture) of Ukrainian Soviet Socialist 
Republic (Ukrainian SSR). The first block of what became to be known as Kuchurgan (also 
spelled Cuciurgan) power station or Moldavskaya GRES (acronym for the “State Regional 
Power Station”) was finished in 1964, using hybrid technology of extracting electricity from 
burning gas or coal. The similar and more advanced technology was also used in other blocks 
completed later. The location of the power station was chosen with both practical and political 
considerations in mind. The practical ones probably prevailed – the spot was located inside the 
Moldavian SSR, most of which is seismically active but not Kuchurgan location. Moreover it’s 
located on the banks of Kuchurgan liman (the word “liman” is a Ukrainian designation for lake/
lagoon type of natural water reservoir near the estuary/delta of a river) near, but not on Dniester 
River itself, i.e. with very low chance of flooding. The Soviet power station typically has high 
water consumption, and therefore location on Kuchurgan liman was perfect. But there was also 
a political side of the decision. The borders of Moldavian SSR did not copy the borders of inter-
war Moldova (Bessarabia) located then in Romania. By a bureaucratic decision and some ad hoc 
ethnic calculations this newly created Soviet republic was deprived of access to the sea in the 
Bugeac region, access to the northern region of Hotin, but was united with remnants of pre-war 
Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (Moldavian ASSR), which – to the confusion 
of many researchers from recent era – did not have almost anything in common with post-
WWII Moldavian SSR in terms of geography. These territorial remnants became to be known as 
Pridnestrovie in Russian or Transnistria in Romanian, although the term Transnistria was being 
used by Romanian fascist regime for much wider territory during WWII, reaching up to the city 
of Odessa. The current term Transdniestria is the OSCE compromise between the two. The 
origin of many Moldavian SSR functionaries was Transdniestrian and location of many strategic 
enterprises was deliberately chosen to take place inside Transdniestrian territory, as both 
population and territory on the left bank of Dniester belonged to the Soviet Union between WWI 
and WWII, and was therefore considered to be much more easily controllable. That was also the 
case of Kuchurgan power station. One more pre-emptive measure was taken in order to have only 
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loyal workers employed – the entire new town was built next to the power station. Bizarrely the 
town – called Dnestrovsk – is actually an integral part of much bigger village of Nezavertailovka 
but while the village retains its countryside character, Dnestrovsk remains a Soviet type of town 
composed of typical Soviet sixties’ “Khrushchovka” buildings. Very little has changed since the 
sixties there.
2.2. Construction of nuclear plant halted = stroke of luck for future Transdniestrian 
regime
The current regime in Transdniestria – in place since 1992 – would have had very hard 
times to survive without the Kuchurgan power station. It is its main enterprise, which until 
now supplies 83% of energy to the Republic of Moldova and also major part of energy supplies 
to Odesskaya oblast’ of Ukraine. Without knowing it in advance, the Transdniestrian regime 
had yet another stroke of luck in the eighties. It was actually very tragic stroke of luck – the 
Chernobyl disaster. As the Soviet regime was obsessed with nuclear energy and the Kuchurgan 
power station technology was becoming obsolete, Soviets decided to build a thermonuclear 
power station nearby. It was not meant to completely replace Kuchurgan but it should have 
supplied Odessa city and surroundings with heat and energy, and thus alleviate pressure on 
reliability of ageing Kuchurgan. But it had to be safe from any potential risk of earthquake, and 
therefore it was decided to build it on Ukrainian SSR territory rather than Moldavian SSR. As 
in case of Dnestrovsk, the Soviet authorities decided to build an entire new workers’ town on 
location of the new nuclear power plant in 1981. Its name is Teplodar, which in Russian means 
“Giving heat”. However the 1986 Chernobyl disaster halted any plans to build a nuclear power 
plant in situ. The plans were completely abandoned in 1997 by independent Ukraine. The town of 
Teplodar has roughly 10.000 inhabitants and actually has had some attraction as a cheap housing 
alternative for Odessites but in spite of that it looks like a ghost town. And in spite of its name its 
inhabitants suffer from lack of heating and energy because of its immense debts accumulated 
due to unsustainability of the very concept of a city built in unsuitable location and in the form 
of just a couple of immense Soviet-type blocks of flats. Thus – after turbulent dissolution of 
the Soviet Union and de facto separation of Transdniestria from the Republic of Moldova – the 
Transdniestrian regime was given an unlikely trump card: the only viable source of energy in 
a perimeter of hundreds of kilometres. The only other relatively viable but inefficient source 
of energy comes from Dubasari hydro-electric power station on Dniester River. And yet again 
Transdniestrian authorities were lucky since the core of this power plant lies on the left bank of 
Dniester, i.e. under Transdniestrian control. However the capacity of Kuchurgan surpasses the 
one of Dubasari more than 50 times.
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3. Ownership of the Kuchurgan power station and all inputs
3.1. Two components of Russia’s involvement
The very fact that the authorities in Tiraspol, the Transdniestrian capital, were in control 
of the energy production for Moldova and vast parts of southern Ukraine, would not make them 
able to actually exercise this control. The authorities were neither able to invest in innovation of 
technology, nor procure much needed fuel for the power plant – gas and/or coal – independently. 
And here comes the involvement of Russia, which in longer perspective might actually be more 
important than a military intervention in Transdniestria and keeping the military force on 
territory under Transdniestrian control.  The involvement of Russia has two crucial components. 
The first component is the ownership of Kuchurgan power station by Inter-RAO, the Russian 
energy giant company, and the second component is the supply of Russian gas on bianco cheque 
(that may eventually get accumulated as debt of the Republic of Moldova, not Transdniestria!) to 
the power station.
3.2. Ownership of Kuchurgan power station
Originally the state enterprise, the Kuchurgan power station was privatized by the 
Transdniestrian authorities. From Moldovan perspective, and from international law perspective, 
this privatization was illegal. That did not prevent the new owners to exercise their property 
rights. The price for privatization was very low – only US$ 29 million.
The more details about the privatization fall into the sphere of gossips. To put it mildly, 
the privatization in 2003 was quite bizarre. It was auctioned by the Transdniestrian authorities 
starting at US$ 26.5 million but with clear promise by the winner of the transaction that it will 
invest at least US$ 100 million into much needed refurbishment. There were originally three 
competitors – from Russia, Belgium and USA – but the US offer did not meet the requirements of 
the privatization commission. And then, quite surprisingly, the Belgian offer was chosen because 
the Russian offer of the huge state enterprises of Inter RAO and Gazprom was conditioned by 
their requirement that the initial investment of US$ 100 million will not be paid as investment but 
rather erased from accumulated debt for gas. And thus the Belgian company Saint Gidon Invest - 
created specifically for this deal - won the auction, allegedly with backing of Oleg Voronin, son 
of the then president of Moldova Vladimir Voronin. However, not more than one and a half year 
later, in 2005, the Kuchurgan power station was transferred to Inter RAO! The Chairman of the 
Management Board of Inter RAO is Boris Kovalchuk, young Russian entrepreneur and son of 
Yury Kovalchuk, who is a Chairman and largest shareholder in Rossiya Bank, and who was 
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reported by Radio Liberty as “reputed to be Vladimir Putin’s personal banker”. Even though the 
links are unclear, it seems that Kuchurgan power station is fully under control of Russian ruling 
elite.
As only roughly 17% of electricity for Moldova is generated on the territory controlled by its 
legal government or supplied from other sources, the country ended up gradually covering the 
remaining 83% of its electricity needs from a single source – the Russian-owned power plant in 
Transdniestria.
3.3. Control of Russian gas supply
The company called Energokapital provides Transdniestria’s Kuchurgan power station with 
Russia’s natural gas and sells the electricity it produces to the Moldovan state-owned company 
Energocom, which in turn sells it to Moldovan distributors. Energokapital is a primary subject 
of attacks against former de facto president of Transdniestria Yevgeny Shevchuk because it has 
“miraculously” jumped to become a major economic player in the region. Schevchuk actually lost 
“presidential” elections in Transdniestria to Vadim Krasnoselsky at the end of 2016, also due to 
allegations of corruption, so Energokapital might be his elegant way to maintain his influence in 
Transdniestria and in business in entire region.  Moldova’s Ministry of Economy, that controls 
Energocom, decided in favor of Energokapital, which of fered a 28% discount, but actually 
this price seems still too high, as the gas that is uses to produce electricity is not paid back to 
Gazprom, but rather accumulates as debt for Moldovagaz, the Moldovan state gas company 
(itself paradoxically owned by Gazprom, Transdniestrian authorities and a blocking minority 
share controlled by the Moldovan government). Some media have speculated that Energokapital 
is a “cash cow” for both Transdniestrian and Moldovan elites.
4. Conclusion: Corruption responsible for absence of energy security 
policies in Moldova and southern Ukraine?
Two external factors that heavily influence the welfare in the region (and might be 
coordinated from Moscow) is  a) inability of the Republic of Moldova to put in order its energy 
security and limit its dependency on electricity from Kuchurgan and gas from Russia and  b) the 
copy-and-paste situation in southern Ukraine where – since abandonment of the plan to build a 
thermonuclear plant in Teplodar – hardly anything was done to increase energy security. It is 
impossible to find how complicit have been (some of the) representatives of the authorities in 
Moldova and southern Ukraine with Russian plans to regain control of the energy production in 
the region but since the corruption and clientelism have marred the entire region ever since the 
collapse of USSR (and even before), it cannot be excluded; vice versa, it is very likely.
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Since the collapse of the Soviet Union neither Moldovan, nor Ukrainian authorities were 
able to diversify their energy pool, and thus their energy security is very weak and dependent on 
Russia. This absence of energy security strategy raises many questions as it indeed seems that it 
is a deliberate absence. At the end of the day, Moldova’s total reliance on Russian gas and oil is 
further exacerbated by the country’s dependence on a single Russian-owned electricity producer 
located in Transdniestria. Not only it increases the country’s vulnerability, but it also uselessly 
damages Moldova’s partnership with Ukraine.
1. Moldovan Electricity Map; courtesy of: “The Black Sea. EU” - a non-profit online 
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